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THE ALBANY LAW JOURNAL.
TO SUBSCRIBERS.
The volumes of the LAW JOURNAL are strongly and
uniformly bound at this office for $1.50 full sheep, and $1
half sheep.

The Albany Law Journal.
ALBANY,

FEBRUARY 25, 1871.

OF THE RIGHT TO WAIVE A TORT AND SUE
IN ASSUMPSIT.
Judge T. M. Cooley, of the supreme court of Michigan, contributes the following article to the January
number of the Bench and Bar:
A tort is a wrong or injury done by one party to
another, for which the law gives a remedy in damages.
It differs from a crime, in that it is a wrong done to
an individual, and to be redressed at his instance,
while a crime is a wrong done to the commonwealth,
and to be punished by means of a public prosecution.
Every breach of contract is, in a certain qualified
sense, a wrong; but an action to recover damages
therefor differs from an action for a tort, in that, in the
former, the contract itself is counted upon, while in
the latter the suit is for some wrongful act or omission
of duty, which, though it sometimes springs from or
is connected with a disregard of contract relations, is
nevertheless something more than a mere failure to
perform an agreement.
The distinctions between an action for a tort and
one upon contract are such that where the one will lie
the other generally will not; but there are nevertheless some cases in which either may be brought at the
election of the party injured. Thus, it is sometimes
the case, that, in a business relation, the law makes it
the duty of a party to observe a certain course of conduct with regard to the rights of others, where by
contract he has also undertaken for the same thing;
and in such a case a breach of duty is coincident with
a breach of the contract, and the party damnified has
his election to sue either for the tort or upon the
contract.
There are also cases of breach of contract where a
wrong has been done not strictly coincident, but
whore, nevertheless, the damages recoverable are the
samre as those following a breach of the contract, so
that a recovery for the tort gives complete compensation. In these cases, also, the party may elect the
form of action, and a recovery in one will be a bar to
a recovery in the other.
In still other cases, although the act done is purely
one of tort, the law suffers the party injured to charge
the other in contract, and to recover upon the basis
of agreement, though in fact no agreement existed.
In these cases, the law implies a promise on the part
of the wrong-doer to do what he ought to do, and vill
not suffer him to dispute the implication. And where
this is permitted, the party injured is said to have a
right to waive the tort, and sue as upon promises.
It is said by an eminent judge in one case, that "no
party is bound to sue in tort, where, by converting the
action into an action on contract, he does not prejudice
the defendant; and, generally speaking, it is more
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favorable to the defendant that he should be sued in
contract, because that form of action lets in a set-off,
and enables him to pay money into court."I
This, however, is stating the rule much too broadly,
for in most cases the tort feasor could not be prejudiced
by converting the action into one on contract if the
law would suffer it; but well settled rules forbid.
The right to waive a tort and sue in assumpsit, seems
to have been first distinctly recognized in Lambie v.
Dorrell,2 where assumpsit was brought by an administrator to recover the moneys received by the defendant on a sale made by him, without authority, of
debentures belonging to the estate. It was objected
that the action would not lie, because the defendant
sold the debentures under a claim of administration
in himself, and therefore could not be said to receive
that money to the use of the plaintiff, which, indeed,
he had received to his own use; but the plaintiff
ought to have brought trover or detinue for the
indentures. Powell, J., said: "It is clear the plaintiff might have maintained detinue or trover for the
indentures, but the plaintiff may dispense with the
wrong, and suppose the sale made by his consent, and
bring an action for the money that they were sold for
as money received to his use." And Holt, Ch. J.,
said: "Suppose a person pretends to be guardian in
socage, and enters into the land of the infant, and
takes the profits; though he is not rightful guardian,
yet an action of account will lie against him. So the
defendant in this case, pretending to receive the
moneys the debentures were sold for in the right of
the intestate, why should he not be answerable for it
to the intestate's administrator ?"
8
In Longchamp v. Kenney, this doctrine was applied
to the case of one who, being in possession of a masquerade ticket belonging to another, which was issfied
for the purposes of sale, refused either to redeliver it
or to account for its value. In an action for money
had and received, Lord Mansfield said: "If the
defendant sold the ticket and received the value of it,
it was for the plaintiff's use, because the ticket was
his. Now, as the defendant has not produced the
ticket, it is a fair presumption that he has sold it."
And the plaintiff had judgment.
4
In Hambly v. Trott, the same eminent jurist considers the matter further. The question there was,
what actions survive and what do not? "In most, if
not all, the cases," he says, "where trover lies against
the testator, another action might be brought against
the executor, which would answer the purpose. An
action on the custom of the realm against a common
carrier, is for a tort and supposed crime; the plea is not
guilty; therefore it will not lie against an executor.
But assumpsit, which is another action for the same
cause, will lie. So if a man take a horse from another
and bring him back again, an action of trespass will
not lie against his executor, though it would lie
against him; but an action for the use and hire of the
horse will lie against the executor.
"There Is a case," he proceeds, "in Sir Thomas
Raymond 6 which sets this matter in a clear light.
I Per Tindall, Ch.J., in Young v. Marshall, 8 Bing. 43.
2 Ld. Raymn. 1210.

8Doug. 137.
4Cowp. 375.
5Bailey v. Birtles, Sir T. Raym. 71.
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ihere, in an action on the case the plaintiff declared
'that he was possessed of a cow which he delivered to
the testator, Richard Bailey, in his life-time, to keep
the same for the use of him the plaintiff, which cow
the said Richard afterward sold, and did convert and
dispose of the money to his own use; and that neither
the said Richard in his life-time nor the defendant
after his death, ever paid the said money.' Upon this
state of the case no one can doubt but the executor
was liable for the value. But the special injury
required him to plead that the testator was not guilty.
The jury found him guilty. It was moved in arrest
of judgment, because this was a tort for which the
executor was not liable to answer; but moritur cum
persona. For the plaintiff it was insisted that though
an executor is not chargeable for a misfeasance, yet
for a nonfeasance he is; as for non-payment of money
levied upon afierifacias, and cited Cro. Car. 539, 9 Co.
50, a, where this very difference was agreed; for nonfeasance shall never be vi et armi,8 nor contra pacem.
But notwithstanding this the court held it was a tort,
and that the executor ought not to be chargeable. Sir
Thomas Raymond adds, 'vide Saville, 40, a difference
taken.' That was the case of Sir Henry Sherrington,
who had cut down trees upon the queen's land, and
converted them to his own use in his life-time. Upon
an information against his widow after his decease,
Manwood, J., said: 'In every case where any price or
value is set upon the thing in which the offense is
committed, if the defendant dies his executor shall be
chargeable; but where the action Is for damages only
in satisfaction for the injury done, there his executor
shall not be liable.' These are the words Sir Thomas
Raymond refers to. Here, therefore, is a fundamental
distinction. If it is a sort of Injury by which the
offender acquires no gain to himself at the expense of
the sufferer, as beating or imprisoning a man, etc.,
there the person injured has only a reparation for the
delictum in damages, to be assessed by a jury. But
where, besides the crime, property has been acquired
which benefits the testator, there an action for the
value of the property shall survive against the executor. As, for instance, the executor shall not be
chargeable for the injury done by the testator in cutting down another man's trees, but for the benefit
arising to the testator for the value or sale of the trees,
he shall."
Mr. Addison, in his treatise on the law of torts, dismisses this subject after very brief consideration. "If
a man," he says, "has taken possession of property,
and sold or disposed of it without lawful authority,
the owner may either disaffirm his act and treat him
as a wrong-doer, and sue him for a trespass or for a
conversion of the property; or he may affirm his acts
and treat him as his agent, and claim the benefit of the
transaction; and if he has once affirmed his acts and
treated him as an agent, he cannot afterward treat
him as a wrong-doer, nor can he affirm his acts in
part and avoid them as to the rest. If, therefore,
goods have been sold by a wrong-doer, and the owner
thinks fit to receive the price, or part thereof, he ratifies and adopts the transaction, and cannot afterward
treat it as a wrong." I Of the correctness of the doe-

trine as thus stated there is no dispute, and it is well
supported by judicial decisions.'
The right to waive the tort is not, however, confined
to cases of sales of property, but is applicable to all
other cases when the defendant has by wrongful act
become possessed of money which in equity and good
conscience belongs to the plaintiff. As where one
without authority collects moneys which were payable to another ;9 or a trespasser upon lands demands
and receives wharfage dues ;8 or the defendant by

deceit and fraud obtains money from the plaintiff; 4
and the like.
But when we go beyond the cases in which money
has actually come to the hands of the defendant, all is
not so clear upon the authorities. There are many
cases which hold, that if the defendant, by means of a
tort, has obtained money's-worth, assumpsit may be
brought; as where property is wrongfully sold, and
other property received in payment ;5 or the apprentice or slave of another is knowingly employed without the master's permission;G or one turns his
cattle upon the land of another, and pastures them
or by the
there without the owner's consent;'
instrumentality of the defendant in an execution, the
property of another is sold to satisfy the judgment.$
And it has also been held, that where property has
been wrongfully taken and used, assumpsit may be
0
brought for the use after its return.
And in some cases a strong disposition has been
manifested to sustain an action of assumpsit whereever an unlawful conversion appears, whether the
defendant has been benefited thereby or not.
In Walker v. Davis it is said: "Ordinarily in the
case of torts it is at the election of the Owner of property wrongfully taken, to bring his action for the tort,
or, waiving that, to bring assumpsit; and when he
brings the latter, the defendant is estopped to say
there was no promise, and that he took the property
wrongfully, or to set up his own fraud or wrong in
10
If the doctrine of the right
defense of the suit.'
to waive the tort and sue in assumpsit rested solely
upon the early English decisions, there could be little
doubt, we think, that a statement of the general principle as broad as here given would be supported by
them; and there are many cases which hold that
assumpsit may be brought for property wrongfully

I Addison on Torts, p. 83, citing Brewer v. Sparrow, 7
B. and C.310, and Lythgoe v. Vernon, 5 H. and N. 180; 29
Law J.Exch.164.

I See Hitchln v. Campbell, 2 W. B. 827; Abbottv. Barry, 2
B. and B. 369; Powell v.Rees, 7 A. and E. 426; Burley v.
Taylor, 6. Hill, 577; Miller v. Miller, 9 Pick. 34; Gilmore v.
Wilber, 12 Id. 120; A pleton v. Bancroft, 10 Met. 231;
Monson v. Rogers, 2 Scam. 317; Staat v. Evans, 35111. 455;
Leighton v. Preston, 9 Gill, 201; Gray v.Griffith, 10 Watts,
431; Goodsnow v. Luyder, 3 Greene, Iowa, 599; White v.
Brooks, 43 N. H. 402. "The principle Is," says Pollock,
C. B. that the owner of property wrongfily takenlhas
a right to follow it and adopt any act done to It, and treat
the proceeds as money had and received to his use."
Neat v. Harding, 20 Law J. Rep., N. S., Exch.250; S . 4
Eng. L. and Eq. 463. "Subject," he adds, "to certain
exceptions," which, however, he does not point out.
2Hasser v. Wallis, 1 Salk. 28.
SO'Conley v. Natches, 1 S. and M. 31.
4 Pearsoll v.Chapin, 44 Penn. St. 9.
5 Millerv. Miller, 7 Pick. 133; Strickland v. Bemis 14
Ala. 511. See Hilton v.Wetberald, 5 Harr. 38; Budd v.
Hiller, 3 Dutch. 43; Phelps v. Conant. 30 Vt. 283.
6 Curtis v. Bridges. Comb. 450; Foster v.Stewart, 3 M. and
S.191; Lighty v.Clouston, 1 Taunt. 112; Munsey v.Good326.
win, 3 N. H. 272; Stockett v.Watkin's Admr. 2G. and J..
1 Welch v. Bagg, 12 Mich. 42. Compare Stearns v. Dillingham, 22 Vt. 624.
5 Hackley v.Swigert, 5 B. Monr. 88.
9 Stockett v.Watklns, 2 G. and .326; Alsbrook v.Hathaway 8 Sneed, 454.
1sWalker v. Davis, 1 Gray, 509, per Thomas, J. See Badger
v.Phinney, 15 Mass. 359.
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converted by the defendant, whether sold or not.1
But however reasonable these cases may appear, and
harmonious as they seem to be with the general rules
governing the action of assumpsit, they do not appear
to have received universal approval, and at this time
probably the majority of judicial decisions upon the
point under discussion is opposed to them.
In Massachusetts the rule is very clear, that to
authorize the plaintiff to waive the tort and sue in
assumpsit, a sale of the property by the defendant
must be shown.2 In New Hampshire the courts have
finally settled down upon the same rule, overruling
the earlier decisions in the same state.8 In Illinois
and Wisconsin the same rule is adopted. 4 In Vermont it is said "the law is too well settled to admit
of discussion, that to enable the owner of goods to
waive the tort and sue in assumpsit, where they have
been wrongfully taken from him, the goods must
have been converted into money. 5 And there are
like rulings in other states, some of which appear to
have been made on such full consideration of the subject, that they are not likely to be disturbed hereafter
In the same states. 6 We must consequently expect
that, upon this particular branch of our subject, the
authorities in the different states will continue to
exhibit hereafter the same want of harmony which is
now apparent.
In general, a promise will not be implied unless it
appear, either that the defendant intended it should
be, or that natural justice requires it, in consequence
of some benefit received by him.7
A snere naked
trespass cannot, therefore, be made the basis of an
8
implied assumpsit.
And where the defendant has
entered upon real estate under a claim of right adverse
to the plaintiff, the law will not imply a promise, notwithstanding he has made his tortious possession
beneficial. 9 The action of trespass is the proper action
for the trial of the adverse claim in these cases.
I Hill v Davis

3 N. H. 384: Floyd v. Wiley, 1 Mo. 430;
Ford v. Caldweli, 3 Hill (S. C.) 248; Baker v. Corey, 15 Ohio,
9; Fiquet v. Allison. 12 Mich. 328; Webster v. Drinkwater,
8 Greenl. 323, per Mellen. Ch. J.; Jones v. Buzzard, I Hemp.
240; Johnson v. Reed 3 Eng 202; Labeaurne v. Hill, 1 Mo.
613. See also note to 1Putnarm v. Wise 1 Hill, 240; note to
2 Greenl. Ev. 108. In Schweizer v. Weiber, 6 Rich. 159,
this doctrine was held applicable to the case of one who
had wrongfully taken property, and in whose hands it
had been accidentally destroyed. See also Halleck v.
Mixer, 16 Cal. 574; Cooper v. Berry. 21 Geo. 526.
2 Jones v. Hoar,5 Piclk, 285. This appears to bealeading
case on this subject. And see Glass Co. v. Walcott, 2
Allen, 227.
8 Mann v. Locke, 11 N. H. 218; Smith v. Smith, 43 id. 536.
4 Morrison v. Rogers. 2 Scam. 317; O'Reer v. Strong, 13
Ill. 688; Kelty v. Owens, 4 Chand. 166; Elliott v. Jackson,
8 Wis. 649.
5 Stearns v. Dillingham, 22 Vt. 627, per Bennett, J. And
he adds: "The rule is the same where tile trespass consisted in breaking the plaintiff's freehold, and cutting
and carrying away the trees standing thereon. Thetrees
must have been sold by the defendant."
6 See Willett v. Willett, 3 Watts, 277; Pearsoll v. Chapin,
44 Penn. St. 9; Guthrle v. Wickliffe, 1 A. K. Marsh. 83:
Fuller v. Dusen, 36 Ala. 73; Tucker v. Jewett,32 Conn. 563;
Saunders v. Hamilton, 3 Dana, 552; Barlow v. Stalworth
27 Geo. 517; Pike v. Bright, 39 Ala. 332t; Emerson v. McNa-'
mara, 41 Me. 565. Compare Bennett v. Francis, 2 B. and P.
554: Read v. Hutchinson, 3 Camp. 351.
Osborn v. Bell, 5 Denlo, 377, per Beardsley, J., quoting
and adopting the language of Mellen, Ch. J., in Webster
v. Drinkwater, 5 Greenl. 323.
8 Jones v. Hoar, 5 Pick. 285; Stearns v. Dilllngham, 27
Vt. 624. But where the defendant has received money by

means of the trespass, it may be recovered, as we have

before seen, in this action,

See O'Conley v. Natches, 1 S.
9 Carson River, etc., Co. v. Bassett, 2 Nev. 249. As where
the defendant has used a pri vate artificial canal under a
claim that It is a public highway. Ward v. Warner, 8
Mich. 608. In this case, Manning, J., Intimates an opinion

and M. 31.
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It seems that an officer who takes goods by color of
lawful authority is not liable to the owner in assumpsit belore he had sold them and received the price, nor
afterward, if he has paid over the money in pursuance of his process before notice of the plaintiff's
claim.'
But an officer who has kept a person in confinement at hard labor, under a void sentence, and

received personally the benefit of his labor, is liable
for the value thereof 'n an action for work and labor.2
Where an express promise exists, the law will not

imply a different one; and therefore if one purchases
goods upon a condition which he afterward fails to
perform, but keeps and converts the goods to his own
use, the vendor must sue upon the conditional con-

tract, or in trover. Ie cannot waive the tort, and sue
upon an implied contract for goods sold. 8
These references will perhaps sufficiently illustrate

the general current of decision on the subject of
election of remedies in the case of torts. They
will perhaps also show that the right to waive a tort,
and pursue a remedy as upon contract, is not so general as is sometimes supposed. It may be added, however, that if, in case of a tort, the party wronged elects
to sue on contract, and fails to establish a valid
promise, express or implied, he is not bound by that
election, but may afterward sue for the tort. The
cases in which infants have obtained property by purchase, on the false statement that they were of full
age, and afterward defeated an action on the contract

of purchase on the ground of infancy, are illustrations
4
of this rule.
THE LAW OF TRADE-MARKS.*
It is well settled that a manufacturer ,nay, by priority of adoption, or by inventing a new word, secure
a right of property in certain letters, marks, or symbols, so as to be entitled to the exclusive use of the

same to designate the particular property to which it
is affixed. Amoskeag Cbmpany v. Spcar, 2 Sandf.
599; Clark v. Clark, 25 Barb. 76; Barrows v. Knigh.
6 R. 1. 434 ; S'tokes v. Landgraff, 17 Barb. 608; Williams
v. Johnson, 2 Bosw. 1; Wolf v. Goulard,18 How. Pr.
64; Caswell v. Davis, 35 id. 76; Burnett v. _Phalon,
9 Bosw. 192.
that the tort cannot be waived in the case of personal

property appropriated under an adverse claim. He says:

"In a case of pure trespass, by which I mean one committed without color of right to the property taken, the
court may well say to the defendant, 'you shall not be
permitted to defeat the action by showing you took the
goods without intending to pay for them, or with an
tention to do a wrong with which the plaintiff by put-

ting a more charitable construction on your conduct, has

not thought proper to charge you.' This, I think, is all
that is meant by waiving the trespass and suing for
goods sold and delivered. There is no objection to sucha
course, when the trespass is wholly separate from the
right of property; but when It Is mixed up with the right
of property, and the question of trespass or no trespass
depends on that right, and must stand or fall with It, the
trespass cannot be waived, because none is admitted;
and the law will not imply a promise to pay, as defendant took the goods in his own right." But this doctrine,
though receiving some support from Wynne v. Lathan, 6
Jones, L. 329, is opposed to that of several of tile cases
hereinbefore cited, including that of Fiquet v. Allison, in
the same court, 12 Mich. 328.
I Osborn v. Bell, 5 Denlo, 370.
2 Patterson v. Prior, 18 Ind. 441.
3 Strutt v. Smith, 1 C. A. and R. 315; Allen v. Ford, 19
Pick. 217.
4 See Badger v. Phinney, 15 Mass. 359; Walker v. Davis,
1 Gray, 509.

*Prepared by Daniel Ketchum as a note to Coates v.

Holbrook, 2 Sandf. Ch. 586.
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